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Abstract 
Religious-mystical and psychotic altered states of consciousness (ASC) are 
assumed to share common phenomenological and psychobiological features, 
including regressive cognition and changes in body boundary awareness. This 
study aimed to assess the frequency and strength of associations between 
primordial thought language and body boundary imagery in the discourses of 
mystical and psychotic-mystical ASC. The mystical discourse examined here 
is Saint Teresa of Avila’s (1567) mystical writing "The Way of Perfection”, 
and the psychotic discourse is Daniel Paul Schreber’s (1903) autobiographical 
writing “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. The mystical text differs from the 
psychotic text in the frequency of primordial thought language and penetra-
tion imagery. Positive associations were also found between primordial 
thought language and penetration imagery, and barrier and penetration 
imagery, whereas the psychotic text yielded a positive association between 
barrier and penetration imagery only. 
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Introduction 
 
This study aims to investigate the frequency and strength of associations between body boundary 
imagery and primordial thought language in discourses of religious-mystical and religious-
psychotic altered states of consciousness (ASC) based on Saint Teresa of Avila’s (1567) mystical 
writing "The Way of Perfection”, and Daniel Paul Schreber’s (1903) autobiographical writing 
“Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. It is assumed that the linguistic features of primordial thought 
language and body boundary imagery in these discourses might offer some insight into the 
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cognitive organization of mystical and psychotic experiences that can be explained and inter-
preted by using various psychoanalytic concepts and theories. Hence, this paper begins by pres-
enting a brief background on how traditional Freudian and contemporary relational psycho-
analytic theories relate to religious-mystical experiences and pathological delusions. Subsequent-
ly, the introduction discusses psychoanalytic, psychological and linguistic research and theories, 
on mystical and psychotic experiences, in relation to primordial and conceptual cognitive 
functioning and body boundary awareness.  
 
Psychoanalysis and mystical experiences 
 
Altered states of consciousness (ASC) generally refer to personal experiences that are based on 
shifts of psychological and cognitive functioning as compared to conscious states of experience. 
Mystical experiences are a form of ASC in which the mystics believe that they have established a 
transcendental experience with the Absolute, or Ultimate Reality (Cook, 2004). They are often 
brought about and deepened through some form of ritualistic behaviour, such as prayer, breathing 
and visualizations exercises, chanting or meditation (Heriot-Maitland. 2008). Due to the simil-
arity of phenomenological attributes, mystical and pathological delusions are often difficult to 
differentiate from one another (see Lukoff, 1985), but their classification is largely informed by 
the Freudian psychoanalytic view (Graetz Simmonds, 2006). This view considers religion to be a 
neurotic universal compulsion of humanity that stems from suppressed instinctual impulses and 
the ambivalent oedipal feelings associated with neurosis (Freud, 1913, 1927). Hence, a belief in 
God is based on an individual’s “terrifying helplessness in confronting inner and outer forces in 
childhood and the need for protection, which was originally provided by the father” (Freud, 1927, 
p.30). The inability to withstand the discomfort of being exposed to threatening sensory per-
ceptions results in turning towards the wishful illusion of an omnipotent and protective God upon 
which the believer projects the lost feeling of narcissistic omnipotence (Fenichel, 1954).  In this 
sense, the religious belief assumes the function of a coping mechanism in handling existential 
vulnerabilities, such as annihilation anxieties.  
Contemporary psychoanalytic theories have shown an increased interest in exploring and 
re-evaluating the interaction between psychoanalysis and religious-spiritual belief. One theory is 
that religious illusion might not represent regression to a pathological infantile state; rather, it 
represents a state of adaptive regression allowing the individual to repair unconscious conflicts 
by confronting and overcoming aspects of the false self, which then allows the individual to 
return to the true self (Fauteux, 1995; Jones, 2007). The notion of a reparative state resonates 
with Melanie Klein’s manic-depressive stage of infant development (1935, 1946) during which 
an infant seeks to mourn the mother as an object loss and to integrate all the “bad parts”, such as 
aggressive drives, that were projected onto the mother during the paranoid-schizoid period. The 
integration process generally begins during infancy but is assumed to continue throughout a 
person’s life, allowing the individual to integrate the split “good” and “bad” parts in his or her 
personality and thus to seek self- and other-whole object integration. The positive view of reli-
gious illusion as a reparative process was bolstered by the proposition of a potential third space 
(Winnicott 1971) that represents a missing link between the Freudian reality principle and the 
pleasure principle and thus reframes religion as a transitional phenomenon (Meissner, 2008). 
Congruent with the cognitive problem-solving model that assumes an adaptive and experiential 
problem solving function of ASC (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Jackson & Fulford, 1997), the creative 
potential of mystical experiences has been associated to the process of adaptive regression that is 
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characterized by strong emotional arousal, the so-called “peak-experience”, and hallucinations in 
which the individual gains a new insights and perspective and thus leading to adaptive changes of 
behaviour (Allison, 1968).  
 
Primordial thought in religious-mystical experiences 
 
Regression in religious experiences has been also associated to the Freudian principle of prim-
ordial cognition (Wilson, 2009). The notion of primordial and conceptual thought functioning 
represent equivalents to the Freudian concept of primary and secondary process.1 Thus, Freud 
(1900) suggested that the primary (primordial) and secondary (conceptual) processes represent 
distinct modes of cognition within the psychic apparatus. Primary process thought is concrete, 
irrational, free-associative, as well as being unrelated to logic, time and spatial constrains, and 
free from social and moral conventions. It is assumed to function in relation to the primary pro-
cess principles of displacement, condensation, and symbolization (Freud, 1900). Primary process 
thought is also the principal awareness of young children and has been associateed with the 
cognitive operations of ASC, such as dream, meditative, mystical trance and drug-induced 
hallucinatory states. In contrast, secondary process thought obeys the abstract principles of gram-
mar and logic, time and space, social conventions, and reality-tested knowledge in typical, 
everyday situations for older children and adults.  
Melanie Klein’s (1935, 1946) paranoid-schizoid and depressive position might represent 
forms of cognitive functioning complimentary to Freud’s proposition of the primary and second-
ary process (Robbins, 2011). Hence, the paranoid-schizoid position and primary process are 
based on perceptions in which aspects of the self and others remain undifferentiated, whereas in 
the depressive position and secondary process, the self and other are recognized as differentiated 
entities. However, both processes might be complementary and interconnected. In particular, the 
gradual separation from internal fantasies and external events and a transitional integration of the 
reality principle is assumed to take place within an intermediate transitional space (Winnicott, 
1971). In contrast, a mother’s intolerance to contain these emotions might lead to the infant being 
unable to introject the mother’s containing function. The infant’s uncontained anxiety exists then 
as a nameless anxiety that lacks a symbolic shape that leads to premature individuation. The 
transformation of primary process to secondary process cognition is also based on the experience 
of the self as a subject in relation to the subjectivity of the other. Hence, it assumed that the 
secure and containing ego boundaries of the mother that gradually transform the infant’s anxiety 
and aggressive feelings and thus for the infant to integrate these threatening emotions in a more 
tolerable form, and thus to develop a sense of self-awareness and relatedness (Bion, 1962; Bollas, 
1994). In this sense, the interaction of the self and other’s realities shape the development of a 
coherent self-schema, as much as mental representations based on the experiences of multiple 
social selves (Benjamin, 1992; Mitchell, 1993). The notion of interrelated primary and secondary 
processes has been also suggested in religious experiences based on the assumption that the 
religious experiences is situated within an intermediate space that allows the believer to make use 
of inherent capacity of imagination and that might fulfil an ontological function (Meissner, 1984; 
Rizzuto, 1979). 
 
                                                 
1 The concepts of primordial and conceptual thought are primarily influenced by Werner’s (1948) and 
Goldstein’s (1939) theories of regressive cognition that are based on a drive- and sensation-orientated 
assumption as compared to a narrowly Freudian psychoanalytic view on primary process thought. 
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Primordial thought in schizophrenia 
 
How primordial thought might be associated to the formal thought disorder that occurs in schizo-
phrenia has been extensively researched (e.g., Arieti, 1974; Meloy, 1986). The cognitive 
deficiencies of formal thought disorder are based on intrusions of unintended memories and un-
structured, ambiguous, externally derived sensory inputs (Hemsley, 1993, 1996). Thus, an in-
dividual diagnosed with schizophrenia may not be able to selectively attend to internal and 
external stimuli, for which internal events are misinterpreted as a causal consequence of extern-
ally derived perceptions. In particular, the executive processes of the working memory are 
connected to referential processes and emotion schemas that verbally express both concrete and 
abstract experiences (Bucci, 1997). Psychological research puts forward that emotion schemas 
are acquired in early mother-attachment, and allows us to identify emotions in the form of 
physical sensations and cognitive awareness. An insecure attachment style is associated with the 
development of dissociative disorders and schizophrenia, which include the dissociation of parts 
of the self, including emotions, bodily sensations and cognitive processes (for a brief literature 
review see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). These dissociative tendencies are related with a 
disorganized attachment style in which a child experiences the caregiver as being frightened or 
frightening at one time, and other times as available and caring (Main & Hesse, 1990; Liotti, 
1992; in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, p. 402). As a result of being exposed to the caregiver’s 
inconsistent and erratic expressions, the child develops an incoherent and fragmented self-image, 
and thus the ability to functionally integrate anxieties and other threatening emotions that remain 
split off the child’s conscious awareness. The lack of a functional infant-mother bond and pres-
ence of repressed painful emotions continue to exist in form of a so-called “black hole” 
(Grotstein, 1989, 1990).2 According to Gerzi (2005), the black hole is encapsulated by a narciss-
istic envelope that allows some memory fragments to survive and meanwhile shielding off the 
painful and unbearable memories and feelings. This transient state is however interrupted by the 
emergence of the symbolic tear (or original trauma) in the envelope that creates a chaotic internal 
state of acute threat. The narcissistic part of the self attempts to ward off these strange experi-
ences with defensive processes, such as splitting and denial, resulting in the individual being 
pulled into the “black hole” and thus causing the fluctuation between intense and overwhelming 
feelings, and states of emotional void. 
Bion (1955) puts forward that the notion of splitting is also reflected in the schizoid 
language that actively splits objects when the internal persecutory fear is projected unto external 
objects and perceived by the patient as an external destructive threat and the loss of internal good 
object. Due to the destructiveness of splitting on the actual links within thought processes, the 
schizoid mode of thought is typically characterized by an inability to use and differentiate be-
tween concrete (primary process/primordial thought) and abstract forms (secondary process/-
conceptual thought) of representation. The inability to make such a distinction is assumed to 
function as a defence mechanism to repress unconscious emotions and to regress to a primordial 
state consistent with the schizoid’s sense of incomplete ego-boundary differentiation (Searles, 
1962, p.28). The illusionary withdrawal from an external reality to an internal reality assumes 
then a protective function to ward off feelings of aggression that are perceived to invade the 
body, threatening to annihilate the remaining sense of ego (Klein, 1928). In contrast, schizoid 
                                                 
2 Grotstein (1989, 1990) holds the existence of the black hole as the single most important factor in 
psychotic illness. 
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thinking emphasizes spatial and behavioural aspects (Jackson, 1995) through the use of subject-
ive metaphorical formations that are generally incomprehensible and inconsistent with socially 
agreed upon symbols and concepts (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956). The con-
creteness of literal thought in schizoid patients has also been termed de-animation (Mahler, 1958) 
and de-symbolization (Searles, 1962).  
 
Linguistic analysis of primordial thought  
 
Computer-assisted quantitative linguistic research has investigated the occurrence and frequency 
pattern of primordial and conceptual thought language by using the Regressive Imagery Diction-
ary (RID) (Martindale, 1975, 1990) (see method section). In relation to mystical texts, Martindale 
(1974, 1979) investigated so-called night journey narratives (e.g., Aeneid, Book VI) and more 
complex texts that describe a hero’s spiritual journey to God (e.g., Dante’s Divine Comedy) 
(Martindale 1987, 1990). The hero’s journey in these narratives was hypothesized to represent an 
initial regression from conceptual to primordial thought, followed by a return to conceptual 
thought awareness. The results confirmed this hypothesis and showed a high frequency of 
primordial thought language as the hero transitioned to the mystical world, whereas a return to 
temporal realms was reflected by a reduction in primordial thought language. West (1991) also 
predicted that the awareness of primordial regression would be reflected in religious-mystical 
experiences in the form of high frequencies of primordial thought language. The results showed 
that the entire content of the King James Bible reflects a homogenous rise-fall-rise-fall-rise 
pattern of primordial thought language, thus lending support to Evelyn Underhill’s (1911) five-
stage model of spiritual development in Christian mysticism. The results also provide some evid-
ence for the Freudian notion of regression to ontologically earlier ways of organizing in religious 
experiences.3 Conversely, the results, in particular Martindale’s studies on night journey nar-
ratives, separate the occurrence of primordial and conceptual thought functioning, and thus con-
tradict the before mentioned psychoanalytic notion that there is primordial thought in conceptual 
thought, and vice-versa. 
Computer-assisted content analysis using the RID has also been used to gauge the 
frequency of primordial thought language in patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, 
non-paranoid schizophrenia, and patients with non-psychotic disorders. The analysis shows that 
the speech of individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia reflects significantly higher 
frequencies of primordial thought language (in particular Icarian lexis4) than non-paranoid 
schizophrenics and non-psychotic individuals with other psychiatric disorders (West and 
Martindale, 1988). Thus, this result provides some support for the psychoanalytic assumption that 
the development of schizophrenia is preceded by a regression to an early form of organizing 
experiences that is based predominantly on primordial functioning. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The results were also replicated in Wilson’s (2009) study “Barrier and penetration imagery in altered 
states of consciousness discourse: replicating the five-stage model of Christian mysticism in the Bible that 
investigated”, based on a slightly different methodology. 
4 Icarian lexis represents a set of primitive and pre-linguistic symbols (e.g., spatial references, fire, and 
water) for drives and emotions (Martindale, 1981). 
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Regressive body boundary awareness in religious experiences 
 
The notion of regression in ASC is also associated with changes in body boundary awareness, 
including merging, depersonalization, and blurring of body boundaries with respect to an indi-
vidual’s sense of separateness to time and space (Harrison, 2008; Wilson, 2008). Hence, the 
notion of blurred boundaries in religious-mystical experiences may assume the salient function of 
connecting to and identifying with God. This fusion experience (Ludwig, 1966; Prince & Savage, 
1966) has been characterized as “joyful, blissful, luminous, spaceless and timeless, infinitely 
peaceful, free from all pain and concern” (Hartcollis, 1976, p.215), and an Absolute State of 
Unitary Being (Newberg, d’Aquili, & Rouse, 2001). In a letter to Sigmund Freud (Freud, 1927), 
Romain Rolland referred to this religious sentiment of mystical oneness and cosmic oblivion as 
an “oceanic feeling”. Freud proposed that this oceanic feeling might represent regression to an 
early phase of limitless narcissism that might facilitate the fulfilment of a nostalgia for the 
mother’s breast, thereby achieving a state of fusion and unity with the mother. In such a fusion, 
religion and spirituality would symbolize the maternal world (Mahler, 1968; Lewin, 1950; 
Saroglou, 2003). The state of limitless narcissism and oneness is initially experienced by the 
infant when it is not able to completely differentiate between internal and external, or between 
self and other. The primal object loss of the mother as a love object and the breast as a satis-
factory oral stimulus is assumed to be a precondition for the infant to recognize its body 
boundary in relation to reality, and thus to create the concept of ego (Freud, 1905).  
Relational psychoanalysis has also conceptualized the development of body boundary 
awareness in relation to the autistic-contiguous position that is based on primitive sense-orient-
ated experiences that are derived in the mother-infant (Ogden, 1989). These primitive experi-
ences are conceptualized in relation to the infant’s awareness of its skin boundary that creates an 
internal space by setting itself apart from the environment and other objects. Drawing on Bick’s 
(1968) theory on the function of skin in early object relations, the disturbed development of the 
primal skin may result to the second skin formation that wards off these anxieties as an attempt to 
construct an alternative holding skin container of the self-boundary through the use of reassuring 
rhythmic movements and muscular tensions. The defective formation of a containing skin 
formation may result in infantile psychotic disintegration or autistic unintegration (Meltzer, 
1975).  
 
Regressive body boundary awareness in psychotic experiences  
 
The blurring of psychological boundaries, or within the pathological terminology the so-called 
ego-boundary disturbance or passivity phenomenon, is commonly perceived as a typical feature 
of psychotic regression. Psychotic body distortions are expressed in various forms, including 
bizarre bodily sensations and functions, feelings of depersonalization and changes in body con-
sistency (Guimón, 1997). In such a weakened ego-boundary, the individuals perceive themselves 
as the passive recipients whose own internally generated thoughts are controlled and implanted 
by an external force, such as auditory hallucinations and thought insertions, and equally believing 
to be able to surpass others boundaries and broadcasting their own thoughts to other people 
(Mullins & Spence, 2003). Stephens and Graham (1994) also differentiate between through pro-
cesses that have been influenced by an external force and thoughts that have been merely inserted 
into the mind of an individual.  
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More recent developments contextualized symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., changes of 
body boundary awareness) in relation the continuum of schizotypy (Peters, 2001). Individuals 
with schizotypal personality disorders “may be superstitious or preoccupied with paranormal 
phenomena that are outside the norms of their subculture” (APA, 2000, p.701). The conceptual-
isation of psychotic experiences in relation to a continuum assumes the occurrence of a healthy 
functioning individual with schizotypal personality traits at one end of the continuum, and the 
presence of schizophrenia symptoms at the polar opposite end of the continuum (Claridge, 1994). 
Based on this continuity model of psychotic characteristics, the differentiation of individual 
differences (i.e., personality traits) and mental health disorders (e.g., psychotic symptoms) 
becomes blurred and obscured (Peters et al., 1999). Empirical evidence has also shown that high 
scores on positive symptoms were associated with out-of-body experiences (McCreery & 
Claridge, 1995), profound religious experiences (Jackson, 1997), gifted creativity (Post, 1994), 
and members of new religious movements (Day & Peters, 1999; Peters et al., 1999). The 
attributed creativity to high schizotypy scorers has also lead to the proposition that psychotic ex-
perience might have an evolutionary benefit, such as problem-solving function (e.g., Hariot-
Maitland, 2008). 
 
Linguistic evidence of body boundaries 
 
Freud (1923) suggested in “The Ego and Id” that a person consists of a unity between a body and 
a psyche, where “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego…and the ego is ultimately derived 
from bodily sensations” (p.26). Externally derived bodily sensations and feelings are assumed to 
be conscious perceptions, whereas internal perceptions are unconscious processes that are trans-
formed into conscious perceptions and take the form of word presentations (Freud, 1923). Thus, 
verbal expressions reflect residues of unconscious sensory perceptions that interact with meaning 
constructions, interpretative functions, and encoding and retrieval processes. Vergote (1991), 
however, proposes that a person is not made up only of an organic body and psychic body, but 
also consists of an additional duality: the psychic body and the symbolic system of language. 
According to this view, the organic body and the symbolic system of language meet at the 
primordial junction in the psychic body, which allows the person to use cultural symbols and 
language as a means of establishing a relation between the organic and psychic body, and equally 
to differentiate between the psychic ‘I’ and the bodily ‘I’. The strength of these underlying 
psychological structures of the primordial junction that transforms unconscious processes to 
verbal expressions have been investigated in empirical research in relation to body boundary 
awareness.  
Fisher and Cleveland (1956, 1958) firstly proposed a content-analysis scoring system of 
body boundary awareness based on verbal responses of Rorschach inkblot tests by measuring 
barrier imagery (i.e., body boundary definiteness) and penetration imagery (i.e., body boundary 
permeability). The body image scoring system has been used in qualitative and quantitative 
studies to investigate body boundary distortion in schizophrenia. The majority of research, 
however, produced conflicting results. Hence, no solid evidence was found that individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia would have more or less definite body boundary awareness, or 
score lower on barrier imagery, than either individuals diagnosed with neurotic disorders or 
healthy individuals. In several studies, however, individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia often 
had more definite body boundaries, by scoring higher on barrier and lower on penetration 
imagery, than either individuals diagnosed with neurotic disorders or healthy individuals. It has 
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been also demonstrated that boundaries were more definite in paranoid schizophrenia as 
compared to neurotic disorder or healthy controls. The heightened sense of boundaries in 
individuals with paranoid schizophrenia has been attributed to an increased sense of grandiosity 
and power as a central theme of their delusional “cover story” (Fisher, 1970; Fisher, 1986).  
In addition, Fisher and Cleveland’s (1956, 1958) scoring system of body boundary aware-
ness has been investigated in non-pathological ASC. For example, studies on extra-sensory 
perceptions have been shown that individual scoring high on ESP showed lower body boundary 
definiteness (i.e., higher penetration and lower barrier imagery scores) than individual with low 
ESP scores (Schmeidler & LeShan, 1970). Similarly, penetration scores were higher in hypno-
tized individuals than individuals of ordinary state of consciousness (Saraceni, Ruggeri, & 
Filocamo, 1980). The body boundary scoring system has been also applied to other text types 
than inkblot responses, such as dream narratives (Ruggeri & Saraceni, 1981).  
A computerized version of Fisher and Cleveland’s scoring system, the so-called Body Type 
Dictionary (BTD) (Wilson, 2006) (see method section), has also investigated the frequencies of 
barrier and penetration imagery of religious texts (Wilson, 2008, 2009). Wilson (2008) applied 
the BTD to the Douay-Rheims Bible working with the hypothesis that the religious text would 
have a frequency pattern of barrier and penetration imagery equivalent to West’s (1991) fre-
quency pattern of primordial thought language. In fact, the results showed that the frequency of 
penetration imagery reflects a five-stage pattern similar to the one found in the primordial 
thought language of the King James Bible (West, 1991). This finding lends support to the idea 
that barrier and penetration imagery reflect different kinds of psychological phenomena, and also 
that the blurring of body boundaries might relate to regressive cognitive functioning associated 
with religious-mystical experiences.  
 
Case study data and research hypotheses 
 
This study is based on Saint Teresa of Avila’s (1567) mystical writing "The Way of Perfection” 
and Daniel Paul Schreber’s (1903) autobiographical writing “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. 
The former text refers to an early writing of Saint Teresa of Avila, who is regarded as one of the 
principal Spanish mystics of the 16th century and was a key figure in the reform of the Carmelite 
order. The mystical writings of Saint Teresa have also been the subject of a psychoanalytic 
inquiry whose goal was to outline the hysterical dimensions in mystical delirium (see Vergote, 
1988). The latter text by Schreber was the source of Freud’s (1911) classic case study entitled 
“Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides)”, which aimed to demonstrate that paranoid schizophrenia stemmed from repressed 
homosexual wishes in combination with an underlying father complex (Quinodoz, 2004). 
Schreber’s autobiography has also been the subject of computer-assisted content analyses that 
critically contrasted their findings with previous psychiatric and explanations of “Memoirs” 
(Klein 1976; Laffal, 1965; Martin, 2008; O’Dell & Weidman, 1993). Notably, though, Saint 
Teresa’s mystical writing "The Way of Perfection” and Schreber’s “Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness” have to be differentiated. The religious-mystical text represents an objective post-hoc 
discourse of a transient religious-mystical experience (see Wilson, 2008, pp.44-47) that may be 
perceived as real while the person is experiencing this religious-mystical experience, but is often 
not considered to be real once the person returns to everyday consciousness (D’Aquili & 
Newberg, 2000). In contrast, the psychotic text exemplifies the writing of a psychotic experience 
as a psychiatric symptom of a permanent psychotic disorder.  
LAURA A. CARIOLA 44 
Drawing on previous empirical research that investigated primordial thought language and 
body boundary imagery in the discourses of mystical and psychotic ASC, the first hypothesis, 
then, (H1) is that the psychotic text has a higher frequency of primordial thought language than 
the mystical text. In relation to psychoanalytic theory of formal thought disorder that assumes a 
dysfunctional emotional awareness in schizophrenia, the second hypothesis (H2) is that the 
mystical text has a higher frequency of emotion language (i.e., positive affect, affection, sadness, 
anxiety, aggression, expressive behaviour, and glory lexis) than the psychotic text, whereas the 
psychotic text would use more Icarian lexis than the mystical text. With respect to body boundary 
awareness, the third hypothesis (H3) is that the mystical text has lower frequencies of barrier and 
higher frequency of penetration imagery as compared to the psychotic text. In addition, the fourth 
hypothesis (H4) is that primordial thought language is positively associated with penetration 
imagery, but negatively associated with barrier imagery in both the mystical and psychotic text. 
 
Data and Method 
 
Texts 
 
The first text is the English translation of the mystical discourse of Saint Teresa of Avilia’s 
(1567) "The Way of Perfection”. The second text is an English translation of Daniel Paul 
Schreber’s (1903) autobiographical writing “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. The introductory 
texts, prefaces, translators’ notes, and footnotes were not included in the analysis. Both texts were 
divided into segments according to the original divisions by chapter. The first text comprises 43 
segments, and the second text 31 segments.  
 
Objective measures  
 
RID. The RID is a coding scheme that measures the frequency of primordial and conceptual 
thought language, and emotion language. The RID contains about 3200 words and roots that are 
stored in 29 primordial thought categories, 7 conceptual thought categories, and 7 emotion 
categories (see Appendix Table 1). In particular, primordial thought is measured on the sum of 
the categories Drive, Regressive Cognition, Perceptual Disinhibition, Sensation, and Icarian 
Imagery. Empirical research using the RID has also produced consistent evidence that proves the 
categories of the RID a valid and reliable tool to measure primordial and conceptual thought 
language (Martindale, 1975; see also Wilson, 2011). The semantic content and categories were 
derived from empirical literature and studies on primordial process cognition (Martindale, 1975, 
1990) based on the assumption that the lexical content of a text would reflect unconscious 
material and psychological states, referred to as lexical leakage (Spence, Scarborough, & 
Ginsberg, 1978). For example, greater right brain hemisphere activation has been associated with 
a high frequency of primordial thought language in adults (Galin, 1974; Martindale, Covello, & 
West, 1986). Hines and Martindale (1973) also confirmed the theory of the psychoanalytic 
aesthetic, which proposes that highly creative individuals would use more primordial thought 
language than non-creative individuals (Kris, 1952). Higher frequencies of primordial thought 
language have been also identified more often in the stories of young children than in the stories 
of adults (West, Martindale, & Sutton-Smith, 1985). The same finding also holds for stories 
written under the influence of psychotropic drugs, as opposed to the stories of control groups 
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(Martindale & Fisher, 1977; West, Martindale, Hines, & Roth, 1983); fetish stories, as compared 
to normative romantic stories (Wilson, 2002); the poetry of pathological writers versus non-
pathological poets (Martindale, 1975); and the folktales of primitive cultures, in contrast to those 
of more complex cultures (Martindale, 1976). Theoretical concepts that assume some similarity 
to primordial thought have also been proposed from a number of disciplines, such as the 
primitive mentality hypothesis (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910), preformal thought (Piaget, 1954), sensate 
thinking (Sorokin, 1957), three processes of functioning (Aulagnier, 1975), semiotic and sym-
bolic (Kristeva, 1996), and la langue (Johnston, 2009).  
 
BTD. The BTD is a computerized dictionary that calculates the frequency of semantic items 
categorised as barrier imagery and penetration imagery based on Fisher & Cleveland’s (1956, 
1958) scoring system of High and Low barrier personalities. An individual would project their 
one’s body boundary awareness upon the surfaces of surrounding objects, for which barrier 
imagery scores relate to surfaces being described as protective and enclosing, whereas 
penetration imagery scores relate to responses referring to the weakness and permeability of a 
perceived surface. According to this scoring system, a high frequency of boundary imagery 
corresponds to a high barrier personality, and a low frequency of barrier imagery indicates a low 
barrier personality. However, both personality categories are assumed to represent independent 
personality dimensions, rather than opposite ends of a polar personality model.  
The BTD contains 551 words for barrier imagery and 231 words for penetration imagery, 
and 70 exception words that prevent the erroneous matching of ambiguous word stems that are 
assigned to 12 semantic categories (Wilson, 2008). The semantic categories of barrier and 
penetration imagery can be seen in the Appendix Table 2.5 The BTD was first applied to compare 
the frequencies of barrier and penetration imagery in fictional rubber boots fetish narratives and 
modern romantic fiction narratives (Wilson, 2006). Based on the prediction that clothing 
fetishism would yield an inflation of both barrier and penetration imagery (Newbold, 1984), the 
results, however, indicated that the fetish narratives showed a higher frequency of barrier 
imagery but lower frequency of penetration imagery as compared to the romantic narratives, 
which might indicate a compensation of a weak boundary differentiation, referred to as exo-
skeletal defence (Popplestone, 1963). Theoretical models similar to Fisher and Cleveland’s thick 
and thin barrier personality have been proposed, including skin ego (Anzieu, 1985), amoebic self-
theory (Burris & Rempel, 2004), and crustacean and amoeboid self-protection in autism (Tustin, 
1981). 
 
Content analysis. The RID and BTD were applied to the texts by using the PROTAN content 
analysis software program that measures the occurrence of category-based lexical content in a 
text (Hogenraad, Daubies, & Bestgen, 1995; Hogenraad, Daubies, Bestgen, & Mahau, 2003). The 
PROTAN software divided each text into its chapter segments. A lemmatisation process was then 
applied to reduce inflected words to their base form. For example, “agrees, agreed, agreeing” 
were all reduced to “agree”. Subsequently, the lexical content of the segmented and reduced 
texts was matched against the predefined categories of the RID and BTD. PROTAN computes 
                                                 
5 Wilson (2006) excluded the lexical items ‘boot(s)’, ‘Wellington(s)’, ‘welly/wellies’, and ‘mud’ in order 
to control for increased lexical focus on boots in the rubber boot fetish narratives. In fact, the first version 
of Fisher and Cleveland’s body boundary scoring system (1956) contained ‘clothing items with unusual 
covering and decorative function’, and only ‘buildings with unusual structures’, whereas the second 
edition (1958) included all types of ‘clothing items’, ‘vehicles’, and ‘buildings’. 
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two raw counts of lexical occurrences. The density count shows how many distinct lexical items 
(i.e., types) match each dictionary category; the frequency count represents how many lexical 
items in total (i.e., tokens) match dictionary categories. The frequency rate was used in this study 
based on the following formula: 
 
1000 .
frequency countFrequency rate no of tokens in segment!  
 
Statistical analysis. All statistical calculations were performed with the statistical language and 
software “R” (R Development Core Team, 2011) and the R:commander {Rcmdr} package (Fox, 
2005).  An initial Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) showed that the majority of lexical 
variables were not normally distributed in the segments of both text types. Hence, a non-
parametric significance test appeared most suitable to assess the frequencies of the linguistic vari-
ables. A two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test (Mann & Whitney, 1947) with a p < .05 level of signif-
icance was used to compare the values of primordial and conceptual thought language, emotion 
language, and body boundary imagery between the two populations (i.e., the two authors). 
Subsequently, a two-tailed Kendall’s tau-b rank correlation coefficient test (Kendall & Babington 
Smith, 1938) was used to assess the strength of association between primordial and conceptual 
thought language, emotion language, and barrier and penetration imagery. The Kendall’s tau rank 
correlation coefficient has been suggested to be more suitable when applied to psychiatric data as 
compared to either the Pearson’s product momentum correlation coefficient or the Spearman’s 
rho rank correlation coefficient (Arndt, Turvey, & Andreasen, 1999).  
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
The total word count and word count was calculated for all segments of the mystical and 
psychotic texts. The results showed that the mystical text used 74,897 words in total with a mean 
of 1,741.79 words per segment (SD = 704.49), whereas the psychotic text used 84,219 words in 
total with a mean of 2,716.74 words per segment (SD = 1315.90). A Mann-Whitney U test 
indicated that the segments of the psychotic text used in total significantly more words, p < .001, 
and also a more diverse vocabulary, p < .001, as compared to the segments of the mystical text. 
The descriptive statistics of text length per text type and segment are represented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of total text length and text length per segment in the texts  
"The Way of Perfection” and “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. 
 Text type 
Segment Way Memoirs 
1 646 788 
2 953 3638 
3 1785 2537 
4 2238 90 
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5 3020 3322 
6 1270 4146 
7 1678 4417 
8 2568 4061 
9 901 5104 
10 957 4438 
11 1611 3340 
12 997 3344 
13 1752 3553 
14 1754 3703 
15 665 2784 
16 1524 3170 
17 2428 2641 
18 1466 2161 
19 1777 3039 
20 3495 2291 
21 1480 2697 
22 1703 3249 
23 1662 1961 
24 1233 447 
25 1229 375 
26 754 779 
27 1932 2721 
28 1213 4116 
29 2316 1621 
30 1688 982 
31 1517 2702 
32 3092 - 
33 2599 - 
34 1366 - 
35 2919 - 
36 1157 - 
37 2655 - 
38 999 - 
39 2747 - 
40 1324 - 
41 1673 - 
42 2137 - 
43 2017 - 
Mean 1741.79 2716.74 
Median 1673.00 2784.00 
SD 704.49 1315.90 
IQR 1009 1677 
Total word count 74897 84219 
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In addition, the results indicated that in total, conceptual thought language had a higher mean 
frequency than primordial thought language. As for emotion language, the frequency of affection 
lexis (M = 3.12, SD = .93) was highest in the mystical text, and aggression lexis (M = 2.51, SD = 
.88) was highest in the psychotic text. In contrast, positive affect language had the lowest 
frequency in the mystical text (M = 1.23, SD = .72), and sadness lexis had the lowest frequency 
(M = 1.00, SD = .65) in the psychotic text. There was only a marginal difference in frequency 
between barrier and penetration imagery in both text types. The descriptive statistics of 
primordial and conceptual thought language, emotion language, and body boundary imagery can 
be seen in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Mean, median, standard deviation, and interquartile range of primordial thought 
language, emotion language, and body boundary imagery in the texts  
"The Way of Perfection” and “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”. 
 
 Way (N = 43) Memoirs (N = 31) 
Linguistic variable Mean Median SD IQR Mean Media
n 
SD IQR 
Primordial thought 6.26 6.09 .88 1.14 8.84 8.75 .99 1.21 
   Icarian 1.98 1.89 .81 .75 2.83 2.86 1.02 1.14 
Conceptual thought 10.42 10.35 .62 .68 10.51 10.54 .56 .90 
Emotion 5.76 5.63 .78 .99 4.23 4.22 .87  .96 
   Positive affect 1.23 1.33 .72 .64 1.04 1.09 .56 .64 
   Anxiety 1.64 1.54 .68 .89 1.07 1.16 .63 .91 
   Sadness  1.29 1.37 .75 .84 1.00 .97 .65 .88 
   Aggression  2.26 2.12 .76 1.27 2.51 2.27 .88 .90 
   Affection 3.12 3.01 .93 .77 1.51 1.59 .64 .53 
Expressive behaviour  .42 .00 .54 .78 1.29 1.32 .72 1.15 
   Glory 3.08 3.08 .50 .74 1.45 1.50 .59 .60 
Barrier imagery 1.75 1.63 .66 1.00 1.70 1.67 .80 1.03 
Penetration imagery 1.44 1.42 .57 .58 1.88 1.85 1.04 .69 
Total Body Boundary 
Imagery 
3.19 3.13 .98 1.25 3.58 3.46 1.62 1.50 
 
RID. Consistent with the first research hypothesis (H1), the results showed that the segments of 
the mystical text had a significantly lower frequency of primordial thought language, p < .001, 
than the segments of the psychotic text. However the segments of neither text differed in the 
frequency of conceptual thought language, p = .40. The segments of the mystical text also used 
significantly less Icarian lexis, p < .001, as compared to the segments of the psychotic text. In 
contrast, the segments of the mystical text had a significantly higher frequency of total emotion 
language, p < .001, including anxiety lexis, p < .001, affection lexis, p < .001, and glory lexis, p < 
.001, but less expressive behaviour lexis, p < .001, as compared to the segments of the psychotic 
text. No significant differences were identified in positive affect lexis, p = .21, sadness lexis, p = 
.07, or aggression lexis, p = .21. Thus, the second hypothesis (H2) was only partly substantiated.  
 
BTD. The results indicated that the segments of the mystical text had a lower frequency of 
penetration imagery, p < .01, than the segments of the psychotic text. The segments of both texts 
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type in the frequency of barrier imagery, p = .82, or total frequency of body boundary imagery, p 
= .23, and thus the third hypothesis (H3) was rejected. 
 
RID and BTD. Kendall’s tau (") rank correlation coefficients were computed for all linguistic 
variables in both text types (Table 5 and 6). The results showed that primordial thought language 
was positively associated with penetration imagery in the mystical text and negatively associated 
with conceptual thought language, but no such associations were found in the psychotic text and 
thus the fourth hypothesis (H4) was only partly substantiated. In the mystical text, barrier and 
penetration imagery were only almost correlated, but the psychotic text reflected a higher positive 
association between barrier and penetration imagery. Moreover, the results indicated that pen-
etration imagery was moderately positive associated with Icarian imagery in the mystical text, but 
not in the psychotic text. Additionally, the results showed that in the psychotic text, penetration 
imagery showed a moderately positive association with aggression lexis, and barrier imagery was 
moderately positive associated with glory lexis.  
 
Discussion 
 
The psychotic text had higher frequencies of primordial thought language and penetration 
imagery than the mystical text. These results might indicate that the mystical and psychotic 
experiences might differ in relation to the underlying cognitive processes. The inflated frequency 
of penetration imagery in the psychotic text, however, could be also associated to the immediacy 
of the stream-of-consciousness writing of Schreber’s psychotic experiences, as compared to the 
post-hoc discourse of a transient religious-mystical experience. In particular, the results sup-
ported the assumption that psychotic text focuses primarily on spatial references and expressive 
behavioural reference instead of metaphorical and abstract expression (Jackson, 1995). In con-
trast, the mystical text showed a greater emotional awareness than the segments of the psychotic 
text, which lends some support to the tendency of emotional dissociation in psychotic disorders 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
 Two of the most interesting findings were a positive association between primordial 
thought language and penetration imagery in the mystical text and a positive association between 
barrier imagery and penetration imagery only in the psychotic text. These differences in cor-
relation might indicate that both text types differ in the underlying organization of cognitive 
processes with respect to the ASC. Thus, the positive association of primordial thought language 
and penetration imagery in the mystical text might reflect a functional regulation between 
regressive states and penetrative boundary awareness. The mystical experience might represent a 
state of adaptive regression that allows one to confront aspects of the false self and to enhance the 
individuation of one’s true self (Fauteux, 1995; Jones, 2007). 
Hence, the notion of an adaptive function also resonates with the proposition that assumes 
mystical experiences to be situated within an containing and intermediate space of subjective and 
objective processes that allows the gradual integration of unconscious material, fantasies and 
conflicts within the consciousness awareness of the reality principle (Meissner, 1984; Rizzuto, 
1979; Winnicott, 1971), and thus assuming an adaptive function to gain new insight that might 
lead to adaptive behavioural changes (Allison, 1968; Batson & Ventis, 1982; Jackson & Fulford, 
1997). In fact, it has been proposed that Saint Teresa struggled with issues that hindered her 
spiritual development, i.e., attachment, false humility, and excessive concern over honour, which 
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she was able to confront during the purgative state (Conrow Coelho, 1990). In contrast, a chaotic 
organization of regression and changes in body boundary awareness in the psychotic text might 
reflect a dysfunctional self-reparative function within regressive states of psychotic disorders. 
In addition, the differences of association between primordial thought and body boundary 
imagery in the religious-mystical and psychotic texts might also relate to Klein’s (1935, 1946) 
developmental stages of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position. Thus, psychotic and 
mystical experiences differ with respect to the functional regulation of the internal “bad” and 
“good” object images, where the “bad” object image reflects destructive personality aspects, such 
as death anxiety, which are first experienced during self-individuation in early infancy. The 
positive association between primordial thought language and penetration imagery in the 
mystical text showed might indicate that the religious-mystical experience allows the individual 
to find an inner feeling of functional oneness with the “bad” and “good” object parts as integral 
parts of the individual’s personality, and thus to gradually overcome the depressive position 
(Klein 1935). Consistent with psychoanalytic theories (Bick, 1968; Bion, 1962; Ogden, 1989), 
the reduced body boundary awareness might perhaps reflect a regression to an earlier form of 
organizing experiences in which sensory-perceptions are transformed through the containing 
function of the mystical experiences, or perhaps closeness to God, into conscious material that 
allows an increased self-development and self-knowledge. A similar suggestion has been 
proposed by Rickman (1957, as cited in Graetz Simmonds, 2006) in his psychoanalytic study of 
Quaker practice and belief. This paper, entitled “Need for Belief in God”, put forward that the 
absence of the father figure and the practice of waiting for the inner light would enable an 
individual to experience the oceanic feeling. This need to connect to God would correspond to 
the Kleinian manic-depressive position (Klein, 1935) rather than narcissistic regression that 
characterizes cognitive functioning in psychotic states (Graetz Simmonds, p.133).  
In contrast, the personality disintegration of psychotic experience is based on the reactive-
ation of an early aggressive and chaotic object relationship that results in the hateful splitting of 
objects (Hartcollis, 1976). An individual that does such splitting relates to the self and others as 
part-objects that embody either entirely positive or negative personality aspects, which indicates 
an inability to surpass the Kleinian (1946) paranoid-schizoid position. The notion of part-object 
relation appears to be reflected in Schreber’s emotional processes, where the psychotic text 
reflects an ambivalent emotional regulation in relation to body boundary awareness. The in-
creased emotional susceptibility seen in the aggressive lexis with a low body boundary awareness 
might reflect a tendency to perceive the body as being invaded from the “inside” and “outside” 
by aggressive emotions. These aggressive emotions were possibly perceived as a force threat-
ening to annihilate the remaining sense of ego (Jackson, 1995). Conversely, the examples of 
glory lexis comprise a set of lexical items that relate to a general positive (if also hysterical) 
emotional valence, which is more prominent in heightened body boundary awareness that 
distinguishes between the “inside” and the “outside” of the self. Thus, emotional responsiveness 
in high and low boundary awareness might reflect a dynamic emotion regulation in psychotic 
illnesses. As put forward by Klein (1928), the aggressive emotional valence in low boundary 
awareness might indicate heightened identification with the sensory perception of external 
threatening elements and their immediate threat to “destroy” the internal “goodness” of the 
remaining ego, in high boundary awareness, whereas the internally “good” parts are reinforced 
through the process of a glorified identification of the externally projected “good” parts.  
 
 
Table 5. Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients of all linguistic variables in Saint Teresa’s “The Way of Perfection” 
Linguistic variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Primordial thought   1.00             
2. Icarian imagery  .258*  1.00            
3. Conceptual thought -.182 -.211*  1.00           
4. Emotion  .014  .057 -.087  1.00          
5. Positive affect  .198  .003  .018  .010  1.00         
6. Anxiety  .192  .110 -.016  .227* -.034  1.00        
7. Sadness  .106  .010 -.092  .261*  .068  .147  1.00       
8. Aggression -.049 -.009 -.127  .321** -.161  .191  .259*  1.00      
9. Affection -.013  .095 -.205*  .530** -.081  .109  .049  .034  1.00     
10. Expressive behaviour  .178  .157 -.169  .069 -.090 -.029  .030 -.020  .140  1.00    
11. Glory -.045  .121  .158  .088 -.136 -.256* -.209* -.157  .038 -.027  1.00   
12. Barrier imagery   .031  .069 -.121 -.098 -.034 -.029 -.130 -.017 -.096  .068  .197  1.00  
13. Penetration imagery  .272*  .349** -.244* -.068 -.037 -.030 -.017  .040 -.016  .166  .037 .226*  1.00 
Notes: * p < .05 level, ** p <  .01 level  
 
Table 6 – Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients of all linguistic variables in Daniel Paul Schreber’s “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness” 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Primordial thought  1.00             
2. Icarian imagery  .231  1.00            
3. Conceptual thought -.222 -.334**  1.00           
4. Emotion  .056 -.121  .151  1.00          
5. Positive affect  .161  .211  .026  .280*  1.00         
6. Anxiety -.013  .150  .061  .233  .147  1.00        
7. Sadness .182  .000 -.042 .    .551**  .508**  .274*  1.00       
8. Aggression -.045 -.196  .088  .530** -.061  .017  .204  1.00      
9. Affection  .145  .017 -.089  .164  .072 -.041  .057 -.084  1.00     
10. Expressive behaviour  .069 -.004  .091  .232  .390**  .118  .266* -.117  .011  1.00    
11. Glory  .184  .128 -.002  .259*  .146  .146  .211  .115  .108 -.107  1.00   
12. Barrier imagery  .011 -.054 -.119  .121 -.020 -.122  .061  .067  .037   .000  .281*  1.00  
13. Penetration imagery  .097 -.054 -.110  .293*  .022 -.126  .158  .274*  .132   .091  .208  .431**  1.00 
Notes: * p < .05 level, ** p <  .01 level  
 
 
 
Additionally, whereas regression in mystical experiences assumes the function of a 
transitional space to integrate unconscious material, the ambivalent emotional regulation in 
relation to changes in body boundary awareness within the psychotic experience resonates with 
Gerzi’s (2005) attractor model. In relation to this study, glory lexis in high body boundary 
awareness might represent such an attractor model, wherein the black hole excludes the 
threatening insights from conscious awareness and “pulls the trauma patient…into a realm of 
emotional void, of hole object transformation, devoid of memories” (p.1033). In contrast, 
aggressive emotions in low boundary awareness might represent the symbolic tear (or original 
trauma) in the envelope that creates a chaotic internal state of acute threat (“bad objects”) to the 
stability and well-being of the self, in which the split off external stimuli penetrate and disrupt the 
sense-perception.  
Although a recent view holds that psychotic delusions might represent creative expressions, 
it is also assumed that it is not possible to create representations of these subjective trauma 
experiences within the void and alienation of the “black hole” (Laub & Podell, 1995). Hence, 
Gerzi (2000) suggests that the creative expression of these threatening perceptions would 
externalize the internal painful feelings, thus allowing the traumatic material to be gradually 
structured and integrated within a coherent self-schema (Gerzi, 2005). The expression of these 
frightening insights then would reframe the subjective trauma experience as a shared inter-
subjective experience within a social environment that functions as a transitional space, and the 
witnessing “Others” of these artefacts become the holding containers and social skin that 
envelops the individual (Tietel, 2002). The social sharing of these creative objects might also 
further the ability to engage with socially accepted symbols and metaphors, as much as placing 
the psychotic forms of expression within a responsive sociocultural environment. 
Furthermore, the results showed a co-occurrence of barrier and penetration imagery in the 
texts of both authors, which might support the notion of emotional fluctuation within the attractor 
model of trauma, as much as supporting Newbold’s (1984) assumption that low barrier 
personalities would use high frequencies of both barrier and penetration imagery, in order to 
overcompensate for an inherent awareness of their underlying psychological fragility and vulner-
ability. The mystical text, however, showed a weaker association between barrier and penetration 
imagery as compared to the psychotic text, and thus reflecting Schreber’s the inherent psych-
ological instability as associated to the ambivalent object relationship dynamic. Hopper (2003) 
suggests that an extreme oscillating tendency between both crustacean and amoeboid features 
might moderate the need for, and fear of, intimacy. Steiner (2004) demonstrates that the notion of 
“gazing” might demonstrate Schreber’s ambivalence between establishing a closeness with, and a 
distance from, objects, which might be representative of Schreber’s psychopathological object 
relationship. For example, Schreber would gaze at objects, and when they failed to confirm his 
feelings of omnipotence, he would feel an intense sense of betrayal in combination with a feeling 
of triumph over the objects. The objects were then humiliated and defeated, before they could 
reassert their status through the use of counter-projection, by which they could re-establish their 
dominance over Schreber and reverse their humiliation (p. 270).  
In summary, this study showed that the religious-mystical and psychotic discourse 
differed in the frequency and co-occurrence of primordial thought language, emotion and body 
boundary imagery, indicating that both text types vary in the underlying organization of cognitive 
processes with respect to the ASC. Future research could investigate how these research findings 
are replicable in relation to other discourses of religious-mystical and psychotic experiences, 
including religious conversion experiences (Cariola, in preparation). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Semantic categories and examples of primordial and conceptual thought language in the 
RID (Martindale, 1975, 1990). 
PRIMORDIAL  THOUGHT LANGUAGE  Examples of semantic items 
Drive   
Oral Breast, drink, lip 
Anal  Sweat, rot, dirty 
Sex Lover, kiss, naked 
Sensation  
General sensation Fair, charm, beauty 
Touch Touch, thick, stroke 
Taste Sweet, taste, bitter 
Odour Breath, perfume, scent 
Sound Hear, voice, sound 
Vision See, light, look 
Cold Cold, winter, snow 
Hard Rock, stone, hard 
Soft Soft, gentle, tender 
Defensive symbolization  
Passivity Die, lie, bed 
Voyage Wander, desert, beyond 
Random movement Wave. Roll, spread 
Diffusion Shade, shadow, cloud 
Chaos Wild, crowd, ruin 
Regressive cognition  
Unknown Secret, strange, unknown 
Timelessness Eternal, forever, immortal 
Conscious alteration Dream, sleep, wake 
Brink-passage Road, wall, door 
Narcissism Eye, heart, hand 
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Concreteness At, where, over 
Icarian imagery  
Ascend Rise, fly, throw 
Height Up, sky, high 
Descend Fall, drop, sink 
Depth Down, deep, beneath 
Fire Sun, fire, flame 
Water Sea, water, stream 
CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT LANGUAGE   
Abstraction Know, may thought 
Social behaviour Say, tell, call 
Instrumental behaviour Make, find, work 
Restraint Must, stop, bind 
Order Simple, measure, array 
Temporal references When, now, then 
Moral imperatives Should, right, virtue 
Emotions  
Positive affect Cheerful, enjoy, fun 
Anxiety Afraid, fear, phobic 
Sadness Depression, dissatisfied, lonely 
Aggression Angry, harsh, sarcasm 
Expressive behaviour Art, dance, sing 
Glory  Admirable, hero, royal 
 
 
Table 2. Semantic categories and examples of barrier and penetration imagery in the BTD 
(Wilson, 2006), including all clothing items, vehicles and buildings. 
Barrier imagery Examples of semantic items 
Clothing items Dress, robe, costume 
Animal with distinctive or unusual    
skins, including shelled creatures 
Alligator, badger, peacock, snails, shrimp  
Enclosed openings in the earth Valley, ravine, canal 
Unusual animal containers Bloated, kangaroo, pregnant  
Overhanging or protective surfaces Umbrella, dome, shield 
Armoured objects or objects dependent 
on their own walls 
Armour, battleship, ship 
Things being covered, surrounded or 
concealed 
Covered, hidden, behind 
Buildings Bungalow, cathedral, tower 
Enclosed vehicles Car, ship, truck 
Things with unusual container like 
shapes or properties 
Bagpipes, chair, throne 
Unique structures Tent, fort, hut 
Miscellaneous barrier words Basket, bubble, cage  
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Penetration imagery   
Reference to the mouth being opened or 
used for intake or expulsion  
Eating, tongue, yawning 
Reference to evading, or bypassing or 
penetrating through the exterior of an 
object  
Autopsy, fluoroscope, x-ray, 
References to the body wall being 
broken, fractured, injured and 
damaged, including degeneration of 
surfaces 
Bleeding, stabbed, wounded, withered 
Openings in the earth that have no set 
boundaries  
Abyss, fountain, geyser 
All openings Anus, doorway, entrance 
Things which are insubstantial and 
without palpable boundaries 
Ghost, mud, shadow  
Transparency  Crystal, see-through, transparent 
Miscellaneous penetration words Broken, frayed, hole 
 
 
 
